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Abstract—For high-speed quantum key distribution systems, error 
reconciliation is often the bottleneck affecting system performance. By 
exchanging common information through a public channel, the 
identical key can be generated on both communicating sides. However, 
the necessity to eliminate disclosed bits for security reasons lowers the 
final key rate. To improve this key rate, the amount of disclosed bits 
should be minimized. In addition, decreasing the time spent on error 
reconciliation also improves the key rate. In this paper we introduce a 
practical method for expeditious error reconciliation implemented in a 
Field Programmable Gate Array for a discrete variable quantum key 
distribution system, and illustrate the superiority of this method to 
other similar algorithms running on a PC. Experimental results 
demonstrate the rapidity of the proposed protocol. 
 
Index Terms—Quantum Key Distribution, Error Reconciliation, 
Field Programmable Gate Array 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
t has been more than 20 years since the introduction of 
quantum cryptography, which can be considered as the first 
practical achievement in quantum communication. 
Articles[1]-[3] give an overview of quantum key 
distribution(QKD). The goal of QKD is to create an absolutely 
secure key string between Alice and Bob (two sides of QKD 
system) and thus the key can be used in communication in 
one-time-pad manner. QKD generally contains the following 
three steps: (1) raw key sifting-Alice and Bob compare their 
basis of measurements and only the qubits having the same basis 
are retained. (2) error reconciliation-Alice and Bob correct 
errors in the sifted key by exchanging public information. This 
step can contain several passes. (3) privacy amplification-By 
applying universal hash functions[4] that map a long bit string to 
a shorter one, the information gained by the eavesdropper (Eve) 
can be made arbitrarily small. A typical structure of a QKD 
 
Manuscript received March 13, 2012; revised July 13, 2012; accepted 
September 28, 2012. This work was supported by Chinese of Academy of 
Science, the National Fundamental Research Program of China under Grant 
2006CB921900, the National High Technology Research and Development 
Program (863 Program) of China under Grant 2009AA01A349, the Fundamental 
Research Funds for the Central Universities, National Natural Science Funds of 
China under Grant No: 11178020, 11175170 and the CAS Special Grant for 
Postgraduate Research, Innovation and Practice. 
The authors are with the State Key Laboratory of Particle Detection and 
Electronics and Department of Modern Physics, University of  Science and 
Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, China 
(e-mail:wangjian@ustc.edu.cn) 
 
system is shown as Fig.1.  
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The second step in QKD, error reconciliation, is the focus 
of this work. Aside from any interference by Eve, errors 
inevitably exist due to imperfect equipment. These errors must 
be eliminated by exchanging information through a public 
channel. The first error reconciliation protocol was BBBSS[3]. 
Later on, other protocols like Cascade[5]-[7], AYHI[8], 
Winnow[9], the low-density parity-check(LDPC) 
protocol[10],[11] were used. The Cascade protocol was widely 
used in early QKD systems, because of its high efficiency for 
leaked information compared with the Shannon entropy limit. 
However, the Cascade protocol requires many interactions 
between the two sides resulting in degradation in speed. The 
Winnow protocol speeds the error correction process by 
adopting the Hamming code. The Hamming code corrects an 
error when only one error is in the code block within a single 
interaction, thus decreasing the total interaction frequency. The 
LDPC protocol is a one-way reconciliation method since only a 
single occurrence of information transfer is required for the 
entire key string. However, this protocol requires a LDPC 
decoder with high computational complexity.  Recent work 
concerning LDPC developed some useful techniques[12] to 
facilitate its utility in QKD systems and an important work[13] 
gave the results of the implementations of LDPC code on 
high-end Graphic Processing Units(GPUs) to improve its 
reconciliation speed. 
Up until now most error reconciliation has been completed 
using software on a PC. The rapidly growing demand for a high 
final key rate gives rise to a bottleneck in the entire QKD system. 
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Thus an expeditious error reconciliation protocol is needed. To 
achieve this, Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is adopted 
in practical QKD systems, along with an error reconciliation 
protocol designed for the FPGA compatible device. The strength 
of FPGA is its parallel computing ability, large integrated RAM 
and easy bit-wise operation. Accordingly, the error 
reconciliation method we created considers these FPGA 
attributes. The proposed method is applied only to discrete 
variable QKD systems. 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE RECONCILIATION AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION 
2.1. Introduction to Cascade and Winnow 
Before explaining Cascade[5], we first describe the error 
correction technique used in Cascade which is called BINARY. 
Consider two parties, say, Alice and Bob for simplicity, having 
strings A and B of length N, respectively. B is a little different 
with A where the discrepancy is estimated by the error rate p. 
BINARY works as follows. When Alice’s and Bob’s strings A 
and B have odd number of errors, Alice sends Bob the parity of 
the first half of her string. A comparison between this parity and 
the parity of the first half of Bob’s is done to determine whether 
an odd number of errors exist in the first half, or in the second 
half, of Bob’s string. This process is repeatedly applied to the 
half determined by the comparison until one bit is left, the 
erroneous bit. Finally, this error can be corrected. 
Cascade proceeds in several passes. The number of passes 
is determined by Alice and Bob before execution depending on 
the parameter p. Let A=A1,…,AN and B=B1,…,BN (with Ai,Bi 
∈{0,1}) be Alice’s and Bob’s strings, respectively. In pass m, 
Alice and Bob choose km and divide their strings into blocks of 
km bits. The bits whose position is in Kmv={q∣(v-1)km<q≤vkm} 
form block v in pass m. Alice sends the parities of all her blocks 
to Bob. Using BINARY, Bob corrects an error in each block 
whose parity differs from that of Alice’s corresponding block. 
At each pass i>1, Alice and Bob choose ki and a random function 
fi:[1..N]→[1..  N/ki  ]. The bits whose position in 
Kij={q∣fi(q)=j} form block j in pass i. Alice sends Bob the 
parity of the block Kij, aj=
i
j
q
q K
A
∈
∑  for each 1≤j≤  N/ki  . Bob 
computes his bj’s in the same way and compares them with the 
aj’s. For each bj≠aj, Alice and Bob execute BINARY on the 
block defined by Kij. Bob will find q∈Kij such that Bq≠Aq and 
correct it. All the blocks Kuv for 1≤u<i such that q∈Kuv will then 
have an odd number of errors. Let K be the set of these blocks. 
Alice and Bob can now choose the smallest block in K and use 
BINARY to find another error. Let w be the position of this error 
in strings A and B. After correcting Bw, Bob can determine set B 
formed by the blocks containing Bw from each pass from 1 to 
pass i. He can also determine the set J of blocks with an odd 
number of errors by computing J=(B∪K)\(B∩K). If J≠Ø then 
Bob finds another pair of errors in the same way. This process is 
repeated until there are no more blocks with an odd number of 
errors, at which point pass i ends. 
For security considerations, the information exchanged 
between the two sides should usually be eliminated after each 
pass of the reconciliation process. The information is composed 
of 1 bit for each parity check and log2(ki) bits for each execution 
of BINARY.  However, the innovative aspect of Cascade is that 
it does not drop any bits during the entire reconciliation process. 
This technique improves the computational speed. A possible 
emergence of an error in a given pass can indicate errors in 
previous passes where the corresponding blocks contain the 
same error bit. Hence one error bit could reveal others. Although 
it has a high efficiency, Cascade is limited by its requirement for 
a large number of interactions. This causes great communication 
burden to QKD systems, especially in a public network 
environment. 
Another widely used protocol is Winnow[9] in which Alice 
and Bob divide their key string into blocks according to an 
initial length typically determined by the parameter p. One side 
compares their parities and if they differ, a Hamming code is 
used to correct errors. Hamming code can fix a discrepancy in 
the block pair that contains only one error bit. Unlike BINARY, 
Winnow has the benefit of costing only one interaction which 
results in fewer communication exchanges and a faster process. 
This is particularly beneficial in situations where the classic 
channel has a high latency. 
2.2. An error reconciliation based on FPGA 
The Winnow protocol introduces the idea of correcting 
errors using Hamming code, a linear block code, to decrease 
interaction times. Building on this idea, we develop a 
reconciliation protocol well-suited to be implemented on an 
FPGA. The proposed protocol is as follows: 
1. Initial length of block n0 is determined by the bit error rate p 
between Alice and Bob, so the error rate must be evaluated 
first. In the reference introducing Cascade[5], the authors find 
optimum length n0 is {73, 14, 7, 5} with the corresponding 
error rate p of {0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15}. The observation of the 
relationship between the two parameters implies that n0*p is 
located between 0.7 and 0.8. Since the protocol is especially 
designed to work on an FPGA, the length being a power of 2 
can simplify the entire error correction process. So we let n0 
be the largest value satisfying both n0*p<=0.8 and a power of 
2, but it is set to never less than 8. For example, if the error rate 
p is {0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15}, n0 is set as {64, 16, 8, 8}. 
2. During the ith iteration, the full key string is divided into 
blocks of length ni. Alice compares the parity of each block 
after receiving that of the corresponding block from Bob. If 
the parities for all blocks are identical or ni reaches  N/2  , 
where N is the length of the key string, then it goes to step 5; 
otherwise to step 3. 
3. For the blocks having different parity, a Hamming code is 
used to correct errors. Only blocks that contain one error can 
be corrected. For those holding more than one error, new 
errors may be introduced. 
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4. Double the length of block, that is ni=ni-1*2, permute the 
whole key string and revisit step 2. 
5. Compare the 64-bit long cyclic redundancy check(CRC) code 
of the key strings of Alice and Bob. If they are equal, the key 
string is retained after eliminating the leaked information 
which is exchanged during the reconciliation. If they are not 
equal the key string is abandoned. 
The permutation process in step 4, which requires a large 
amount of pseudo random numbers, heavily influences the 
performance of the protocol. A linear feedback shift register 
(LFSR) is widely used in FPGA design because of its simplicity 
and efficiency. An LFSR is a shift register whose input bit is a 
linear function of its previous state. The input bit is driven by the 
exclusive-or (XOR) of certain bits of the shift register. Because 
pseudo random numbers (PRNs) generated by the LFSR have a 
long cycle period, all the bits in a key string can be visited if the 
initial value of the LFSR, referred to as the seed, has a width 
equal to that of the length of the key string. However, just how to 
use these PRNs to develop an efficient permutation method is a 
difficult problem. A simple permutation scheme is designed as 
follows. Let（a0,...aN-1）and（b0,...bN-1）be two number sequences 
independently generated by two LFSRs using two different 
seeds. Let ai or bi be the position of two bits in the key string that 
are to be exchanged as i runs from 0 to N-1. The effectiveness of 
this permutation method will be shown in Section 3.2.1 
2.3. Composition of a reconciliation module in the FPGA 
design  
The FPGA design, following the description of the protocol, 
consists of four main modules: the interface module, the parity 
comparison module, the Hamming code module, and the 
permutation module. Fig. 2 shows the relationship among these 
modules. 
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Fig.2 FPGA design of the reconciliation 
1. Interface module 
Interface module is designed to receive and send 
information exchanged during the whole reconciliation process. 
Each side requires only two First In First Outs(FIFOs): one for 
incoming data and one for outgoing data. This type of data 
exchange method conserves memory resources. Note that the 
parity comparison module, the Hamming code module and the 
permutation module are not organized in a pipeline fashion, 
because after each pass during the reconciliation, a permutation 
must be done prior to the next pass. A data bus and control 
module was developed to coordinate the use of the FIFOs among 
different modules. All modules connect to the data bus, while at 
any given time, and as determined by the control module, only 
one module serves as the data source.  
Fig.3 illustrates the structure of the interface module. When 
the FIFOs are not full, each side is either performing parity 
comparison or Hamming error coding. Neither side is idle except 
for the case of excessive latency in the local net. When this 
occurs one side is prompted into a wait state. 
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Fig.3 Composition of the interface module 
 
2. Parity comparison module 
Parity comparison module is responsible for calculating 
and comparing the parities of both sides. It also records the 
numbers of blocks which have different parities, and transfers 
the results to the Hamming code module. In the implementation 
of the hardware, parity computation is easily achieved using the 
single data operator ‘^’ as provided by the hardware description 
language Verilog. For example, if the parity of a vector 
x=(x1,…,xn) is desired, it can be expressed as 
parity(x)=^( x1,…,xn) in Verilog and computed in just one clock 
cycle. To achieve the same result using PC software however, 
requires n clock cycles since PC instructions lack a similar 
operator and the computation must be done in serial fashion.  
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Fig.4 Pipeline method used in the parity comparison module 
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Another important advantage of FPGA is the ability to employ 
the widely used pipeline method. There are four steps to finish 
the parity comparison which separately require m1,m2,m3,m4 
clock cycles as depicted in Fig.4. The pipeline method can be 
applied in either case A or case B depending on the specific 
distribution of the clock cycles required by each step. The 
number of the clock cycles on PCs is typically n*N, where 
n=m1+m2+m3+m4 which is usually called the latency and N is the 
length of the key string. As shown in Fig.4, if the pipeline 
method is used in the FPGA, approximately a fraction of 
(m3+m4)/n in case A, and (m1+m2)/n in case B, of the total clock 
cycles can be saved. The pipeline method is also used similarly 
in both the Hamming code module and the permutation module. 
 
3. Hamming code module 
Hamming code is based on a matrix whose size is r*(2r-1) 
and r is the number of rows in the matrix. Fig.5 is an example 
of 3*7 hamming matrix where r=3. Its element can be 
denoted as hi, j=j/2(i-1) mod 2, where i is the row number and 
j is the column number. Since these elements can easily be 
obtained by the left-shift operation, the matrix need not be 
stored in the FPGA, but can instead be generated in real time 
whenever needed. This conserves memory resources. 
Another advantage for the FPGA is that the binary 
multiplication can be achieved with the XOR operation and 
thus only requires one clock cycle. For example, ( a*b mod 
2)=^[(a1,…an) & (b1,…,bn)]. For software running on a PC, 
this calculation would require n instruction cycles due to the 
lack of the single data operator “^” similarly as in the parity 
comparison module. 
 
Fig. 5 Hamming matrix when r=3 
 
4. Permutation module 
Permutation module requires good pseudo random 
numbers with a long cycle period. Two sequences of 
LFSR-based pseudo random numbers are adopted in the 
permutation module as introduced in section 2.2 above. 
We refer to the combination of the four main modules 
described above as a reconciliation module. Each 
reconciliation module handles a length of 64Kbits of the key 
string. Several reconciliation modules may be combined on a 
single FPGA by considering the resources of the specific 
FPGA. In our test in Section 3, eight independent 
reconciliation modules are arranged in the FPGA resulting in 
the ability to handle 512Kbits of the key string. 
III. EXPERIMENT SYSTEM AND RESULTS 
3.1 A real-time QKD system 
The reconciliation protocol is implemented on an FPGA 
using Verilog and is integrated in an actual QKD setup in order 
to test its performance. The QKD setup is constructed based on 
decoy encoding BB84[14]-[16] in order to ensure security and 
also to obtain a longer transmission distance. The qubit 
transmission rate is 20MHz. According to our experiment 
environment, the average photon number is set to 
0.6:0.2:0[17],[18] which represents signal state, decoy state and 
vacuum state respectively, and the corresponding frequency ratio 
is 6:1:1. The QKD system used in the test is depicted in Fig.6. 
There are three main steps: key sifting, error reconciliation, and 
privacy amplification. The classic communication channel is 
composed of USB connection between the FPGA and the PC, 
and an internet connection between PCs of Alice and Bob. This 
channel can satisfy the QKD systems with a photon emitting rate 
of 100MHz. 
Fig.6 A Real-time QKD system 
 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Efficiency of the proposed permutation 
Due to the parity check, most blocks hold an even number 
of errors after one pass. Errors from the same block must be 
separated into different blocks before the next pass so that they 
can be detected and corrected. Let ni be the length of the block 
during the ith pass and  and  be two bits residing in 
the same block, where p and q are two position subscripts of the 
key string. Permutation function is denoted by g. The key string 
is divided into blocks  where j is the sequence number of 
the blocks, 0≤j≤ N/ni . We define a position function 
 P( )=k if ∈ . 
If two bits share the same block sequence number in two 
continuous passes, that is  
P( )=P( ) and P( )=P( ) 
with   
=g( ) and =g( ), 
where m and n are the two corresponding position subscripts 
of the key string after permutation, we say the two bits are 
neighboring bits. A distance function d( ; ) can be 
defined as d( ; )=0  if  and  are 
neighboring bits, d( ; )=1  if they are not.  
Let B be the set of bits who share the same block sequence 
number with . B has  elements represented by 
. We define a function revealing the degree of the 
separation of a bit with the subscript p from other bits in the 
same block, Dp as 
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Dp=
-1 -1-1
, , -1-1
(A ;B )/( -1)
i ii
p n q n in
d n∑ . 
One would hope that Dp=1, indicating that there are no 
neighboring bit pairs and the reconciliation process would 
accelerate. In the worst case Dp=0, implying the permutation 
cannot separate an erroneous bit from other erroneous bits in the 
same block, and the erroneous bit would remain undetected in 
the subsequent pass. 
To gain a global perspective, we define  
Dtot=
-1
=0
/
N
p
p
D N∑ ,  
where N is the length of the key string. Similar to Dp, Dtot 
indicates the degree of the separation on average, and one desires 
Dtot to be near 1, the larger the better. In our test, the seed of the 
first LFSR was set to 5, whereas the seed of the second LFSR 
varied from 1 to N=64K. We measured Dtot for the varying seeds 
of the second LFSR using ni=16. From Fig.7, one can find Dtot 
preserves high value greater than 0.99 at most points of the seed 
except for several ones. When we changed the seed of the first 
LFSR to another fixed value and repeated the above test, we got 
the similar results. In a specific permutation method, the seed of 
the first LFSR can be set to a constant, while the seed of the 
second LFSR has a wide selection range. One needs only to skip 
the several points where Dtot deteriorates severely. 
 
Fig.7 Dtot with different value of the seed of the second LFSR 
 
Fig.8 shows Dtot as a function of ni where we set the seed of 
the first LFSR to 5 and the seed of the second LFSR to 78. Dtot 
deteriorates for increasing ni and decreases sharply for ni≥8192. 
When ni≥16384, Dtot≤0.75 indicating the specialized 
permutation method is not effective for use in the reconciliation 
process. As such, one would desire that in most cases the 
reconciliation would be completed before ni reaches 16384. In 
fact, the reconciliation usually succeeds prior to ni=8192. 
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Fig.8 How Dtot deteriorates when ni increases 
 
For the purpose of comparison, we consider another simple 
permutation method which uses only one LFSR but with a much 
less efficient Dtot. The method acts as follows. Let (c0,…,cN-1) be 
the number sequences generated by an LFSR, and the LFSR 
seed width be equal to that of the length of the key string. 
Through the sequence number q from 0 to  (N-1)/2  , we 
exchange the position of every pair of bits represented by c2q and 
c2q+1. This method also guarantees every bit of the key string can 
be visited and permuted. However, Dtot turns out to be 0.76 using 
ni=16, indicating this is not a good permutation method. 
3.2.2 Efficiency and process time of the proposed 
reconciliation 
There are two important parameters in evaluating the 
performance of the proposed reconciliation protocol: the total 
leaked information I(A;B) and total process time t. I(A;B) is the 
total bits transmitted between the two sides on the channel 
which may be exposed to an eavesdropper. Here A stands for 
Alice and B stands for Bob which are the two communication 
sides during the reconciliation process. 
We first consider the leaked information I(A;B). The 
theoretic lower limit of the amount of leaked information, also 
called the Shannon entropy, is 
( ) ( log( ) (1 ) log(1 ))h p p p p p= − − − − , 
where p is error rate. In addition, the reconciliation efficiency 
is defined as  
( ; ) / ( ( ))f I A B N h p= × , 
where N is the length of the key string. A smaller f means a better 
reconciliation protocol and a protocol with f=1 is considered 
optimal. Fig.9 shows the efficiency as a function of error rate 
where we set N to 64Kbits using a single reconciliation module. 
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Fig.9 Efficiency f for different error rate p 
     
The somewhat vibrative behavior of f may be explained by 
our choice for the initial block length as discussed in Section 2.2. 
In particular, for a certain range of p, n0 takes on the same value, 
that is to say n0 is not a continuous parameter as a function of p. 
When n0 is {64, 32, 16, 8}, p should be the following 
corresponding minimal value {0.0125, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1} and this 
is consistent with the local minimums in Fig.9. We conclude that 
n0*p=0.8 is a satisfactory choice of the initial length. 
We now consider the total process time t for the 
reconciliation protocol. In this case we use eight reconciliation 
modules and set N to 512Kbits. Fig. 10 shows the results where 
t is measured by ignoring the latency and network transmission 
time. That is, the time shown is purely that of the required 
computation needed by the reconciliation modules. When 
integrated in real QKD systems as was done in section 3.1, there 
is typically an additional increase of around 200 ms to the 
overall processing time. 
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Fig.10 Time t for different error rate p 
 
  For a real QKD system, the error rate is generally below 
4%. According to Fig.10 then, error reconciliation can be done 
in less than 50 ms. This implies we can adapt this reconciliation 
method to a sifted key rate of at least 10.5Mbits/s (i.e. 
512Kbits/0.05s). This has an improvement compared with other 
reported reconciliation protocols[19]-[21] among which the 
maximal speed is 5.5Mbits/s using Cascade running on PC[21]. 
In addition, for comparison the same reconciliation on a PC with 
dual-core 2 Ghz processors and pure computational time of 360 
ms results in a speed 1.5 Mbits/s. 
Finally, we should note that hardware environment must be 
taken into account when considering the performance of a 
protocol. This work used the EP3C120F780C7 FPGA 
manufactured by Altera. This is a rather low-end product in the 
FPGA family. The operating clock is set to 100 MHz. The total 
resource cost is 30182/119088(25%) for the logic element and 
1093632/3981312(28%) for the RAM - both relatively low. The 
advantages of the FPGA's parallelism provide for the integration 
of more reconciliation modules in order to improve performance 
without additional considerations. In other words, we consider 
such systems highly upgradeable. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed an expeditious FPGA-based error 
reconciliation method implementable in practical QKD systems. 
Benefits of the method include low hardware and time 
requirements, and the ability to easily upgrade such systems for 
further performance enhancement. This work helps solve the 
common problem of error reconciliation acting as a bottleneck in 
QKD systems. 
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